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THE INFLUENCE OF R&D INVESTMENT AND
DIVIDEND PAYMENT TAX INCENTIVES ON
CORPORATE DIVIDEND POLICY
M. Catherine Cleaveland, Mercer University
ABSTRACT
Although much research on corporate dividend policy exists, the evidence is far from
conclusive. Understanding how dividend taxes affect firm-level decisions is crucial to evaluating
dividend imputation credits which provide shareholder-level tax credits for dividends received or
decreased shareholder-level dividend tax rates, which reduce the double taxation of dividends.
Using changes in New Zealand and Australia’s tax regimes, this paper provides new insight into
the corporate dividend policy views. The results support the double taxation and tax irrelevance
corporate dividend policy views in dividend-paying firms operating in a tax regime with dividend
imputation and capital gains taxes. By documenting a significant decrease in R&D investment
and increase in dividend payment after a change in dividend taxes, this paper also highlights a
void in the current corporate dividend policy views and demonstrates the need for the inclusion
of R&D investment. In New Zealand and Australia, much of the increased dividend payment
appears to have come from a decrease in R&D investment. Thus, if a country decides to decrease
shareholder-level dividend taxes and the country values investment in R&D, it may need to
consider simultaneously increasing the R&D investment incentive.
INTRODUCTION
The role shareholder-level taxes play in corporations’ decisions to pay dividends is still
debated in academic research. Since Black (1976) posed the questions of why corporations pay
dividends given their tax disadvantages and why investors appear to pay attention to them,
researchers have tried to explain corporations’ dividend policies (McKenzie and Thompson,
1997; Miller and Scholes, 1978). Poterba and Summers (1985, 1) reiterate Black’s ideas, and
they demonstrate that when governments tax corporate profits at the corporate level and again
when they are distributed to shareholders as dividends, corporations should not pay dividends.
Shareholders should prefer that corporations retain earnings where they can continue to be
invested by the corporation and increase the corporation’s value (Poterba and Summers, 1985).
Since paying dividends is common among U.S. corporations, corporate dividend policy is
obviously not this straightforward (Poterba, 1987; John and Williams, 1985; Poterba and
Summers, 1985).
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Three perspectives on how shareholder-level taxes affect firms’ corporate dividend policy
dominate the literature: the tax irrelevance view, the tax capitalization (or residual) view, and the
double taxation view (McKenzie and Thompson, 1997; Zodrow, 1991; Poterba, 1987; Poterba
and Summers, 1985). These three views differ as to why corporations pay dividends, how
dividend taxes at the shareholder-level affect dividend payment, and what changes in
shareholder-level dividend tax policy mean for corporate investment.
Utilizing natural experimental settings in Australia and New Zealand, this paper
demonstrates that the R&D investment and dividend payments vary according to the country’s
tax incentives for R&D investment and taxation of dividend payments. The results support the
double taxation and tax irrelevance views in dividend-paying firms operating in a tax regime
with dividend imputation and capital gains taxes. This paper also documents significant
decreases in R&D investment when a tax regime provides dividend implementation but does not
provide explicit incentives for R&D investment. Thus, if a country decides to decrease
shareholder-level dividend taxes and the country values investment in R&D, consideration
should be given to simultaneously increasing the R&D investment incentive. Current dividend
policy views do not include R&D investment in their predictions, and researchers tend to add it
to capital investment to determine a firm’s overall investment. This paper documents the
importance of looking at R&D investment separate from capital investment.
This paper proceeds by further explaining the tax changes in New Zealand and Australia.
It then reviews each of the three corporate dividend policy views. A literature review of the three
corporate dividend policy views then demonstrates that the evidence is inconclusive. The
hypotheses are developed and followed by a discussion of the data and analysis. Lastly, the
results are presented and implications of the paper and its findings are discussed.
COUNTRY SETTINGS
Effective July 1985, Australia implemented R&D super-deductibility which permitted
companies to deduct 150 percent of their R&D cost if the total annual R&D expenditure was
greater than 20,000 Australian dollars and the company registered with the Industry Research
and Development Board (Parliament of Australia: Senate Committee Report on Business
Taxation Reform, 1999). As shown in Table 1, Panel A, prior to July of 1985, firms were
permitted to deduct 100 percent of R&D. In July 1987, Australia implemented an incentive for
dividend payments known as a dividend imputation credit (Table 1, Panel B). A dividend
imputation credit reduces the double taxation of dividends by providing shareholder-level tax
credits for dividends received or decreased shareholder-level dividend tax rates. The dividend tax
credit enabled shareholders to receive a credit known as a “franking credit” for the portion of
dividends paid out of a company’s after-tax profit or “franked dividends” (Petty et al., 2000, 30).
Although Australia refers to its imputation credit as a franking credit, to be consistent with the
terminology in the literature, this paper continues to refer to it as an imputation credit. Thus,
shareholders calculated their imputed credit on fully-franked dividends as follows:
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Imputation Credit =

Dividends * Company tax rate
1 - Company tax rate

Shareholders report the amount of the “franked dividend” they receive plus the
imputation credit in their gross incomes (where the addition of the imputation credit “grosses up”
the dividend received to a before-tax amount). They then claim the imputation credit against
their tax liability (Petty et al., 2000, 31). For example, in 1988 when the maximum corporate and
individual tax rates were both 48 percent, without dividend imputation, an Australian individual
receiving a dividend of $100 from an Australian corporation in the 48 percent tax bracket would
have reported $100 in gross income and been liable for $48.00 in taxes. However, with dividend
imputation, the individual reported not only the $100 in gross income but also the $92.31
imputation credit, calculated according to the above equation. The resulting $192.31 total
increase in gross income, increased the individual shareholder’s tax before credits by $92.31 (i.e.
$192.31 times 48 percent individual tax rate). This $92.31 tax liability is fully offset when the
$92.31 imputation credit is applied against it. Thus, the individual effectively received the $100
dividend from the corporation free of additional tax.
As summarized in Panel B of Table 1, Australia also added an individual-level capital
gains tax in July 1987. Prior to this date, individuals only paid tax on the gain from selling shares
if they held the shares less than 12 months. Since July 1987, when individuals hold shares over
one year, they pay tax on the difference between the sale price and the shares’ cost, indexed for
inflation. They then include this gain in gross income where it is taxed at regular rates. However,
shareholders no longer pay tax on fully-franked dividends they receive while holding the stock
(Thomas and Sellers, 1994, 87).
Prior to April of 1988, New Zealand taxed individual residents’ worldwide taxable
incomes, including dividends, at a three-rate scale of 15, 30, and 48 percent (Cameron, 1996). In
April of 1988, the three-rate scale on individual residents’ worldwide incomes was reduced to a
two-rate scale of 24 and 34 percent. As Panel C of Table 1 shows, corporate rates also fell from
48 to 33 percent (Brash, 1996). At this time, New Zealand also implemented a dividend
imputation credit (Prevost et al., 2002, 1100).
Similar to Australia’s dividend imputation credit, New Zealand residents include
dividends received plus the corporate tax on these dividends (i.e. gross-up amount) in gross
income. They then offset their individual tax liabilities with the tax the corporation has already
paid, i.e. imputation credit (Prevost et al., 2002, 1081). Prior to 1988, New Zealand permitted
corporations a 100 percent deduction for R&D expenditures. While the tax changes in 1988 did
not alter the R&D deduction, the 15 percent reduction in the maximum corporate tax rate
reduced the value of deducting R&D expenditures (Brash, 1996). For example consider a firm
with an income of $20,000 before their R&D expense of $1,000. Prior to the tax change the firm
would save $480 ($1,000 * .48) in taxes via the R&D deduction; after the tax change the same
amount of R&D expense, $1,000, would only save the firm $330 ($1,000 * .33) in taxes.
The settings in Australia and New Zealand provide unique opportunities in which to test
the relationship between R&D investment and dividend payment. Australia went from a tax
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regime without tax incentives for R&D investment or dividend payment to a tax regime with a
tax incentive only for R&D investment and then to a tax regime with tax incentives for both
R&D investment and dividend payment. New Zealand went from a tax regime without tax
incentives for R&D investment or dividend payment to a tax regime offering a tax incentive for
dividend payments. New Zealand did continue its 100 percent deduction of R&D. However,
Thomas et al. (2003) did not classify countries with only a 100 percent R&D deduction as ones
offering incentives for investment in R&D. For comparability, I use the same classification
approach.
Table 1: Summary of Australian and New Zealand Tax Changes
Panel A: Tax Changes in Australia (effective July 1985)
Prior to the Tax Change
After the Tax Change
Immediate deduction for
Immediate deduction for
R&D Investment
100 percent of investment
150 percent of investment
Dividends Received
Taxed fully at shareholder level
Same
Taxed at individual rates only if
Capital Gains Realized
held for less than 12 months;
Same
otherwise, no tax applied
Panel B: Tax Changes in Australia (effective July 1987)
Prior to the Tax Change
After the Tax Change
Immediate deduction for
R&D Investment
150 percent of investment
Same
above $20,000 AUS
Taxed fully at shareholder level
Credit for the portion of the
dividend on which the corporation
Dividends Received
had already paid tax (“franked
dividend”)
Taxed at individual rates only if
Taxed at the individual tax rate on
held for less than 12 months;
the difference between the
Capital Gains Realized
otherwise, no tax applied
consideration received and the
indexed cost base
Panel C: Tax Changes in New Zealand (effective April 1988)
Prior to the Tax Change
After the Tax Change
Immediate deduction for
Same
R&D Investment
100 percent of investment
Taxed fully at shareholder level
Credit for the portion of the
Dividends Received
dividend on which the corporation
had already paid tax
Top Corporate Tax Rate
48 percent
33 percent

CORPORATE DIVIDEND POLICY VIEWS
The three views explaining why corporations pay dividends, the tax irrelevance view, the
tax capitalization view and the double taxation view, differ in the calculation of the corporation’s
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cost of capital and the components included in this calculation. This difference leads to varying
predictions in the event of a change in shareholder-level dividend taxes. This section reviews
each corporate dividend policy view’s calculation of corporate cost of capital and prediction of
alterations in behavior following a change in shareholder-level dividend taxes. Table 2
summarizes the implications for firms under each scenario according to each of the three
corporate dividend policy views.
Table 2: Tax Change Implications for Firms Typically Paying Dividends
Panel A: Given No Explicit Incentive for R&D Investment, the Effect of a Dividend Imputation Credit
R&D Investment

Capital Investment

Dividend Payment

Tax Irrelevance

No Change

No Change

No Change

Tax Capitalization

No Change

No Change

No Change

---------

Increase

Increase

Double Taxation

Panel B: Given No Explicit Incentive for R&D Investment, the Effect of a Decrease in Corporate Tax
Rates
R&D Investment

Capital Investment

Dividend Payment

Tax Irrelevance

---------

Increase

---------

Tax Capitalization

---------

Increase

---------

Double Taxation

---------

Increase

Increase

Panel C: Given an Explicit Incentive for R&D Investment, the Effect of a Dividend Imputation Credit
R&D Investment

Capital Investment

Dividend Payment

Tax Irrelevance

No Change

No Change

No Change

Tax Capitalization

No Change

No Change

No Change

---------

Increase

Increase

Double Taxation

Panel D: Given a Dividend Imputation Credit and an Explicit Incentive for Investment in R&D, the
Effect of Capital Gains Tax on Firms
R&D Investment

Capital Investment

Dividend Payment

No Change

No Change

No Change

Tax Capitalization

---------

Decrease

---------

Double Taxation

---------

---------

Tax Irrelevance

Indicates no prediction. According to the dividend policy view, the variable could
remain the same.

--------increase, decrease, or

Tax Irrelevance View
In the tax irrelevance view investors do not demand that corporations pay greater returns
on equity instruments when shareholder-level dividend tax rates or capital gains tax rates
decrease. Instead investors with similar tax characteristics form tax clienteles. For example,
individuals or institutions with low shareholder-level dividend tax rates (or MTRs) hold stocks
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with high dividend payments. Likewise investors facing high shareholder-level dividend tax rates
will hold stocks with low dividend payments. Due to uncertainty, investors also hold some stock
inconsistent with their tax-preferred dividend payment for diversification. Thus, a “marginal
investor clientele” forms which is indifferent between receiving dividends or capital gains. The
marginal investor is the investor who determines the market price of the securities under
consideration. Under the tax irrelevance view this is the investor whose marginal tax rates on
dividends and capital gains are virtually equal (Poterba and Summers, 1985, 11). Further, as
clarified below, the effective shareholder-level dividend tax rate and capital gains tax rate of
these marginal investors is zero (Poterba and Summers, 1985; Miller and Scholes, 1978; Miller
and Modigliani, 1961).
Miller and Scholes (1978), proponents of this view, argue that all personal taxes can be
effectively laundered. For example, a marginal investor who is selling stock at a loss will also
sell stock with a gain, bringing his effective capital gains rate to zero. Further, a marginal
investor consisting of a pension fund, university, or charity pays no tax and, thus, has a zero tax
rate on both shareholder-level dividends and capital gains. Since the effective shareholder-level
dividend and capital gains tax rates for the marginal investor are zero, the return to the marginal
investor for one dollar initially invested is the return on the investment after corporate-level
taxes. Neither the shareholder-level dividend tax rate nor the capital gains tax rate factor into the
corporation’s cost of equity capital. Since a permanent change in shareholder-level dividend
taxes or capital gains taxes will not result in a change in the corporate cost of equity, corporate
investments and dividend payment policies will not change.
Tax Capitalization View
The tax capitalization view states that shareholder-level dividend taxes are an additional
tax on corporations’ profits, and thus shareholders capitalize future dividend taxes into share
values (Auerbach, 1979; King, 1977). Corporations only pay dividends when they have cash
remaining after paying all other obligations and it is the only method for them to distribute this
trapped equity. Since an alternative tax-advantaged method of distributing the income does not
exist, corporations finance dividends with this remaining or residual cash. In other words,
dividends do not signal the market; they merely return trapped equity to stockholders (McKenzie
and Thompson, 1997; Zodrow, 1991; Poterba and Summers, 1985).
These firms continue to use retained earnings for corporate investment until investors are
indifferent between reinvesting within the firm and receiving additional dividends. Not paying
dividends defers the tax on the corporation’s earnings from the original investment and causes
stock price appreciation. This tax deferral offsets the later shareholder-level dividend tax
(Zodrow, 1991, 500; Poterba and Summers, 1985, 15). In other words, the after-tax appreciation
of the stock equals the after-tax value of foregone dividends. For instance, if a corporation uses
one dollar for new investment, instead of paying one dollar in dividends, the shareholder does
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not have to pay the shareholder-level dividend tax and thus saves an amount equal to the
shareholder-level dividend tax rate. However, the reinvested one dollar will increase the stock
price causing the shareholder to pay a capital gains tax. In equilibrium, the cost to the
shareholder of the corporation investing one dollar instead of paying one dollar in dividends
equals the value of the new investment, qN, which is reflected in the stock price as follows:
(1)
q N = (1 − Shareholder - Level DividendTax Rate) + (CapitalGains Tax Rate)(q N )
where (1- Shareholder-Level Dividend Tax Rate) is the after-tax dividend the shareholder would
have received if the corporation had paid dividends and (Capital Gains Tax Rate)( qN) is the
capital gains tax the shareholder pays as a result of the increase in stock price the new corporate
investment causes. Rewriting equation (1) in terms of the value of the corporate-level investment
of one dollar in equilibrium results in the following:
qN =

1 − Shareholder - Level Dividend Tax Rate
1 − Capital Gains Tax Rate

(2

Whether the corporation pays a dollar of dividends or uses it for corporate investment, the value
to the shareholder of each initial dollar invested in the company is the same, and thus dividend
tax policy plays a role in the value of the corporation but does not influence corporate
investment.
To demonstrate this, consider two scenarios, one in which the corporation pays dividends
and one in which it foregoes paying dividends for corporate investment. In both cases the
individual initially owns 50 shares of stock, each valued at $1.40, giving him a total stock value
of $70. The shareholder-level dividend tax rate is 46 percent, and the capital gains tax rate is 10
percent.
Scenario A: The corporation pays a cash dividend of $1 per share.
Since the dividend is paid and not used for corporate reinvestment, the value of the stock
does not change. The individual pays $23 in shareholder-level dividend taxes [($1 dividend per
share) (50 shares) (0.46 dividend tax rate)], receives $27 after shareholder-level dividend taxes
[($1 dividend per share) (50 shares) – $23 shareholder-level dividend tax], and holds a total of
$70 worth of stock.
Scenario B: Instead of paying the $100 dividend, the corporation uses it for new
investment.
In accordance with equation (2), the corporate investment will cause the stock price to
increase by $0.60 per share [($1 foregone dividend) (1 – 0.46 shareholder-level dividend tax
rate) / (1 – 0.10 capital gains tax rate)]. The individual will pay a capital gains tax of $3 [($0.60
Journal of Economics and Economic Education Research, Volume 14, Number 1, 2013
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share price increase) (50 shares) (0.10 capital gains tax rate)]. The individual now owns 50
shares worth $2 each ($1.40 original stock price + $0.60 increase in stock price), for a total stock
value of $100. Now, suppose, the individual decides to sell stock equal to his overall stock value
increase of $30 [($0.60 increase in stock price)(50 shares)]. Since his shares each have a value of
$2, he sells 15 shares. This leaves him with $70 worth of stock [($2 per share) (50 initial shares –
15 sold shares)]. The total value of the stock, $70 is now the same as it was in Scenario A when
the corporation paid a $1 dividend instead of investing it. Further, the total amount the
shareholder has received is $27 [($30 from stock sale) – ($3 capital gains tax)], the same amount
received in Scenario A.
To summarize the total distribution the individual in Scenario A receives is $27 ($1
dividend * 50 shares - $1 * 50 shares * 0.46 shareholder-level dividend tax rate) which equals
the total distribution the individual in Scenario B receives after selling the portion of stock equal
to the capital gain:

⎡ (1 − 0.46 Shareholder - LevelDividendTax Rate)⎤
⎢
⎥ * 50shares- $3CapitalGainsTax = $27
(1 − 0.1 CapitalGainsTax Rate)
⎣
⎦
Now suppose that instead of selling the 15 shares in Scenario B, the individual continues
to hold all 50 shares and the corporation pays as dividends all after-corporate-level tax returns
from the new capital investment. The individual will receive the return on the investment, less
corporate tax and shareholder-level dividends taxes. The individual will be content with this
after-tax return as long as it is greater than or equal to the initial cost of each dollar of
investment, qN , as defined in equations (1) and (2). Each period the individual’s after-tax return
will be determined by the rate of return of the new corporate investment, the corporate tax rate
and the shareholder-level dividend tax rate. Again, the individual will expect this after-tax return
to equal the initial cost of the investment, qN, leading to the following equation:
qN =

1 − Shareholde r - Level Dividend Tax Rate
=
1 - Capital Gains Tax Rate

(3)

Before - Tax Rate of Return * (1 − Corporate Tax Rate) * (1 - Shareholde r - Level Dividend Tax Rate)

As you can see, the shareholder-level dividend taxes in equation (3) cancel out, demonstrating
that the level of corporate investment is influenced only by corporate tax rates and capital gains
tax rates. Rewriting equation (3) reveals that the value to the individual of the return per initial
dollar invested is as follows:
q N = (Before - Tax Rate of Return)(1− Corporate Tax Rate)(1− Captial Gains Tax Rate)
Journal of Economics and Economic Education Research, Volume 14, Number 1, 2013
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Thus, while a permanent change in shareholder-level dividend tax rates will increase the price of
the stock, unless coupled with a change in capital gains tax rates, it will not result in a change in
corporate investments or dividend payment policies (Poterba and Summers, 1985).
Double Taxation View
Similar to tax capitalization view, the double taxation view contends that shareholderlevel dividend taxes are an additional tax on corporate profits. The shareholder’s after-tax return
is calculated in equation (5):
Shareholder-Level After Tax Return = [(Before Tax Rate of Return) (1 - Corporate Tax
Rate)]
* [(Dividend Payment Rate) (1 – Shareholder-Level Dividend Tax Rate)
+ (1 – Dividend Payment Rate)(Capital Gains Rate)]

(5)

The twist is that the double taxation view holds that despite their tax disadvantage, shareholders
reward corporations when they pay dividends by increasing the stock price. Note that this differs
from the tax capitalization view that stock prices rise when corporations reinvest instead of
paying dividends. Proponents of the double taxation view do not claim to know the reason for
the increase in stock price but simply accept that the market rewards corporations when they pay
dividends (Poterba and Summer, 1985; McClure, 1977). Therefore, as shown below in equation
(6), the shareholder’s required rate of return (corporations’ cost of capital) depends on corporate
taxes and the weighted average of shareholder-level dividend and capital gains taxes:
Shareholder-Level After Tax Return = [(Before Tax Rate of Return) (1 - Corporate
Tax Rate)] * [(w)(Dividend Payment Rate) (1 – Shareholder-Level Dividend Tax
Rate)
+ (1 – w) (1 – Dividend Payment Rate)(Capital Gains Rate)]

(6)

where (w) is the weight shareholders place on dividend taxes, which depends on the dividend
payout ratio. When dividend payout ratios are high, shareholders place less weight on
shareholder-level dividend taxes (w) and more weight on capital gain taxes (1- w). This reduces
the weighted average tax rate of dividends and capital gains and the shareholder’s required rate
of return. This lower weighted average tax rate of dividends and capital gains entices firms to
pay dividends despite their tax disadvantages (Zodrow, 1991; Poterba and Summers, 1985). A
decrease in shareholder-level dividend taxes decreases the amount corporations have to pay for
the shareholder’s after-tax dividend to remain constant. In other words the decrease in
shareholder-level dividend taxes reduces the cost of paying dividends and receiving the increase
in stock price. This motivates the corporation to increase the dividend payout ratio, decreasing
Journal of Economics and Economic Education Research, Volume 14, Number 1, 2013
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the weighted average tax rate of dividends and capital gains and increasing investment (Zodrow,
1991; Poterba and Summers 1985).
PRIOR RESEARCH
Prior research examines the three corporate dividend policy views in a variety of settings.
The literature has not reached a consensus as to the correct view. The three views of corporate
dividend policy, the tax irrelevance view, the tax capitalization view and the double taxation
view, are not necessarily mutually exclusive. They could each hold true for certain corporations
under certain conditions (Poterba and Summers, 1985, 2).
The first of the three corporate dividend policy views is the tax irrelevance view. Under
this view, a corporation’s decision to invest is independent of its decision to pay dividends
(Miller and Modigliani, 1961). Miller and Scholes (1978) warn that many studies rely on shortterm responses to dividends when testing the relationship between taxes and dividend yield or
the relationship between taxes and rate of return. As a result, findings that do not support the tax
irrelevance view often are suspect. They demonstrate that dividend announcement effects, which
also increase rates of return in the short run, bias these studies by creating short-term price
increases.
The tax irrelevance view assumes operation in perfect capital markets; everyone in the
market has the same expectations of future earnings and amount of risk involved. In other words,
everyone participating in the market has the same information set (Mougoue and Mukherjee,
1994). But, researchers have found evidence that managers have superior information regarding
their corporations. Since information asymmetry exists, dividends provide a signal to the market
(Bhattacharya, 1979; Ross, 1977).
The tax irrelevance view also assumes transaction costs and taxes do not exist (Mougoue
and Mukherjee, 1994). However, Easterbrook (1984) contends that not only do taxation costs
exist but agency costs also influence dividend payments. Managers are imperfect agents of
investors, and paying dividends helps to restrict their discretion.
The second corporate dividend policy view, the tax capitalization view states that despite
the fact that shareholder-level dividend taxes are an additional tax on corporations’ profits,
shareholders capitalize future dividend taxes into share values. The after-tax appreciation of the
stock equals the after-tax value of foregone dividends. Thus, a permanent change in dividend
taxation, unless coupled with a change in capital gains taxation, will not result in a change in
corporate investments or dividend policies (Poterba and Summers, 1985, 15; Zodrow, 1991,
500).
Looking at the financing choices of corporations, Masulis (1980) finds that stock prices
increase when corporations exchange debt for equity and decrease when corporations exchange
equity for debt. In his opinion, this supports the tax capitalization view: when debt replaces
equity, stock prices increase because they now incorporate future dividends into the price.
Journal of Economics and Economic Education Research, Volume 14, Number 1, 2013
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Contrary to Masulis’ study (1980), Myers-Majluf’s theory (1984) predicts the opposite:
corporations tend to issue equity when their shares are over-valued. Consistently, Masulis and
Korwar (1986) and Vermaelen (1981) find that new stock issues lower stock prices while
repurchases raise stock prices.
Elton and Gruber (1970) argue in favor of the tax capitalization view by showing that
stock prices fall on ex-dividend days. The stock price falls because the dividend is no longer
included in the stock price. Eades et al. (1984) refute this finding by demonstrating that stock
dividends, which are not subject to a shareholder-level tax, produce similar results in the stock
prices on ex-dividend dates.
Fama and French (1997) also look for evidence in support of the tax capitalization view
using asset pricing models. If the tax capitalization hypothesis is true, they expect a negative
relationship between corporate value and dividend payments. When a corporation pays
dividends, the payout should no longer be included in the firm’s future value; thus, the stock
price should decline. Instead, they find a positive relationship between firm value and dividends
and a negative relationship between leverage and value. They conclude that dividends and debt
convey information to the market about profitability that is not captured elsewhere.
This potential for dividend signaling and the restriction of manager discretion is
incorporated into the third view, the double taxation view (Poterba and Summers, 1985;
McClure, 1977). Similar to dividend tax capitalization, this view contends that shareholder-level
dividend taxes are an additional tax on corporate profits. The double taxation view holds that
despite their tax disadvantage, shareholders still reward corporations when they pay dividends by
increasing the corporate value (Poterba and Summers, 1985; McClure, 1977). The higher the
dividend payout ratio, the lower the weighted average tax rate of dividends and capital gains, and
the lower the shareholder’s required rate of return (Zodrow, 1991; Poterba and Summers, 1985).
Using British data before and after changes in the way Great Britain taxes corporate
retained and distributed income, Poterba and Summers (1985) find that the double taxation view
is the closest match to their results and reject both the tax irrelevance and tax capitalization
views. Their results show that changes in dividend taxation significantly impact ex-dividend
price movements. Dhaliwal et al. (2003) also use the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 to
investigate the effects of the increase in the highest individual tax bracket on stock prices. They
document a positive relationship between dividend yield and long-term stock returns which is
mitigated by institutional ownership which supports the traditional double taxation view.
HYPOTHESES
This paper examines a shareholder-level dividend tax in two countries which have
different tax treatments for R&D investment and which change their shareholder-level dividend
tax policies over the time period investigated. Since firms often deduct R&D in the year
incurred, R&D investment is tax favored in comparison to capital investment. Additional R&D
Journal of Economics and Economic Education Research, Volume 14, Number 1, 2013
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tax incentives come in a multitude of guises. Tax regimes can offer R&D tax credits based on
flat rates (Canada), R&D tax credits based on incremental rates above a base (France, Japan,
Spain, and the United States), or super-deductibility (more than 100 percent) of R&D expenses
(Austria and Australia). Researchers still debate the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives in
increasing R&D investment and the organizational factors influencing this investment
(Hoskisson and Johnson, 1992; Goel, 1990; Hill and Snell, 1989; Bradley et al., 1984; Link and
Long, 1981).
In July of 1985, Australia implemented an R&D investment tax incentive in the form of
super-deductibility. Super-deductibility permitted companies to deduct 150 percent of their R&D
expenses. While New Zealand did not offer an explicit tax R&D incentive, R&D expenses were
100 percent deductible. I use the same classification approach as Thomas et al. (2003) and do not
classify countries with only a 100 percent R&D deduction as countries offering incentives for
investment in R&D. During this study, both New Zealand and Australia also begin taxing
corporate profits only once through dividend imputation credits. Though countries can
implement such credits in a variety of ways, the net effect of a dividend imputation credit is to
reduce the double taxation of dividends by reducing the tax shareholders pay on dividend income
they receive. Table 3 summarizes these changes and defines the four tax regimes.
Table 3: Tax Regimes
Time Period
R&D Investment
Incentive
Tax Regime I

Australia prior to July 1985
New Zealand prior to April 1988
Tax Regime II Australia from July 1985 to June 1987
Tax Regime III New Zealand after March 1988
Tax Regime IV Australia after June 1987

Dividend
Payment Incentive

No
Yes
No
Yes

No
No
Yes
Yes

Effect of Dividend Imputation in the Absence of Explicit R&D Incentives
The dividend policy views vary in their predictions of the effects of a dividend
imputation credit. As summarized in Table 2, Panel A, the tax irrelevance view predicts that
dividend imputation credits will not change the dividend payment or the relationship between
R&D investment and dividend payment. Similarly, the tax capitalization view states that any
change in the dividend payment is the result of a change in the firm’s corporate investment
opportunities; thus, a dividend imputation credit will not change the firm’s corporate investment
policy.
Only the double taxation view of dividend policy suggests that a change in the way
dividends are taxed will alter the dividend payment. According to this view, the market rewards
dividend-paying firms by increasing stock prices when firms pay dividends. A decrease in the
dividend tax decreases the amount of pre-tax dividend necessary for shareholders to receive the
same after-tax dividend. This reduction in the cost of equity capital reduces the firm’s cost of
receiving the market’s reward of an increased stock price. Thus, capital investment and the
dividend payout ratio will increase (Poterba and Summers, 1985, 4). As mentioned earlier, prior
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corporate dividend policy research does not address R&D investment alone. Instead it either
includes it as part of capital investment or excludes it completely. Thus, the double taxation view
of corporate dividend policy does not predict a direction for the change in R&D investment
(Table 2, Panel A). Following a decrease in dividend taxes, the increases in the capital
investment and dividend payment predicted by the double taxation view have to be funded by
either the decrease in the average cost of capital, newly raised capital or as suggested by Thomas
et al. (2003), a decrease in R&D investments. New Zealand’s 1988 tax change provides a setting
in which to explore these relationships and dividend views.
In 1988, New Zealand changed its tax regime from one offering tax incentives for neither
R&D investment nor dividend payment to one offering tax incentives for paying dividends. New
Zealand did continue to offer immediate deduction of 100 percent of the R&D expenses. To be
consistent with prior literature, the 100 percent deduction is not classified as an explicit incentive
to invest in R&D. According to Thomas et al. (2003), after this change, New Zealand firms that
typically paid dividends should have now found paying dividends more attractive than investing
in R&D. At this time, New Zealand also decreased its highest corporate tax rate by 15 percentage
points (from 48 to 33 percent). This reduced the tax benefit of the implicit incentive for R&D
investment, making the incentive for the payment of dividends even stronger. This does not alter
the predictions under the double taxation view. However, corporate tax rates affect the cost of
capital calculation under both the tax irrelevance and tax capitalization views of corporate
dividend policy. Reducing the cost of capital results in an increase in capital investments
according to both of these views (McKenzie and Thompson, 1997; Zodrow, 1991; Poterba and
Summers, 1985; Miller and Scholes, 1978). Panels A and B of Table 2 summarize the effects
these tax changes should have on dividend-paying firms and their R&D investment, capital
investment, and dividend payment according to the three views of how dividend taxes affect
corporate dividend policies.
Defining Tax Regime III as providing only a tax incentive for dividend payment (Table
3), the first hypothesis is as follows:.
H1a

When a country moves from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III, dividendpaying firms will alter their R&D investment.

H1b

When a country moves from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III, dividendpaying firms will increase their capital investment.

H1:

When a country moves from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III, dividendpaying firms will increase their dividend payment.

Effect of Dividend Imputation in the Presence of Explicit R&D Incentives
Australia’s 1987 tax change also provides a setting in which to test the relationships
among the uses of firm resources and the views of what affects corporate dividend policy. In July
of 1987, Australia altered its tax regime from one offering tax incentives only for R&D
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investment (defined as Tax Regime II in Table 3) to one offering tax incentives both for R&D
investment and dividend payments (defined as Tax Regime IV in Table 2). According to the
double taxation view, the implementation of a dividend imputation credit will directly impact the
payment of dividends in dividend-paying firms (Table 2, Panel C). The dividend imputation
credit allows firms to pay less in dividends while shareholders receive the same after-tax
dividend payment. The reduced equity costs make paying dividends and capital investments
attractive uses of firm resources (Poterba and Summers, 1985, 4).
At this time, Australia also implemented a capital gains tax. A capital gains tax would not
cause a change in the dividend payment or investment policy under the tax irrelevance view. The
tax capitalization view contends that implementing a capital gains tax will decrease the after-tax
appreciation shareholders receive when they sell their stock (Table 2, Panel D). In turn, this will
increase the cost of capital and discourage capital investment (McKenzie and Thompson, 1997,
9). Under the double taxation view, the cost of capital depends on a weighted average of
shareholder-level dividend taxes and capital gains taxes. An increase in capital gains taxes alone
would increase a firm’s cost of capital. This increase in the cost of capital would decrease
investments and dividend payout ratios. However, when coupled with dividend imputation which
as discussed above, has the opposite effect on the cost of capital, it is not possible to predict the
movement in R&D investment, capital investment, or dividend payment.
H2a

When a country moves from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV, dividendpaying firms will alter R&D investment.

H2b

When a country moves from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV, dividendpaying firms will increase capital investment.

H2c

When a country moves from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV, dividendpaying firms will increase dividend payment.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY

To test the hypotheses, I examine pooled cross-section firm-year Australian and New
Zealand data from the fiscal year ending 1982 to the fiscal year ending 1993. Where available,
the data comes from the Worldscope Global Researcher Database via Thompson Financial and
Datastream Advance 4.0. The remainder of the data is hand-collected from the Australian
Graduate School of Management Annual Report File and the Australian Stock Exchange annual
reports housed in Perth, Western Australia. Only domestic dividend-paying firms are kept in the
sample since these are the firms which will be most affected by a tax change in their country.
Consistent with Thomas et al. (2003), this paper defines domestic firms as those with (1) less
than 50 percent of their total sales due to foreign sales, (2) less than 50 percent of their total
assets located abroad, and (3) less than 50 percent of their total income due to foreign income.
The complete sample contains 498 firm-year observations.
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In each case, I deflate R&D expense and capital expenditures by size. I deflate dividend
payment by earnings. To test each hypothesis, I use the nonparametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney
test. I run the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test because Bartlett’s test for equal variances rejects the
null hypothesis of equal variances in the each of the deflated variables, and thus the parametric ttest would not be appropriate. I use a two-tailed test when the hypothesis is non-directional and a
one-tailed test when the hypothesis is directional.
RESULTS
The first hypothesis investigates actions of dividend-paying firms moving from Tax
Regime I to Tax Regime III—New Zealand before and after dividend imputation. H1 compares
the amounts of dividend payment, capital investment, and R&D investment in Tax Regime II
with Tax Regime IV, to determine the dominant dividend policy view. Using the nonparametric
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test to investigate H1a reveals that R&D expense deflated by size
changed (decreased) significantly (z = 1.80, p = 0.0714) after dividend imputation. Running the
same test on capital expenditures, deflated by size and dividend payment, deflated by earnings
investigates H1b and H1c. The results do not show a significant change in the median of capital
expenditures; thus, H1b is not supported. However, they do indicate a marginally significant
increase in dividend payment (z = -1.25, p = 0.10) after dividend imputation, supporting H1c.
When New Zealand moved from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III, it also lowered its corporate
tax rate. As Table 2, Panel B shows, all of the corporate dividend policy views predict that R&D
investment could change and that capital expenditures should increase after moving from Tax
Regime I to Tax Regime III. Further while the double taxation view suggests that dividend
payment should increase, the other two views also hold that it may. Since capital investment did
not increase, the results cannot support one corporate dividend policy view over another.
The second hypothesis compares dividend-paying firms operating under Tax Regime II
with those operating under Tax Regime IV—Australia before and after the implementation of
dividend imputation. H2 focuses on changes in investments and dividend payments to investigate
the corporate dividend policy views. Running the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test on R&D and
capital investment deflated by size and dividend payment deflated by earnings investigates the
changes in these variables between the two tax regimes. None of these tests detect significant
changes in the medians of these variables when operating under Tax Regime II versus Tax
Regime IV. Table 2, Panel D, contains the predictions of the corporate dividend policy views.
The tax irrelevance view predicts no changes in R&D investment, capital investment, or
dividend payment. According to the tax capitalization view, R&D investment and dividend
payment may increase. However, it also contends that the capital gains tax which was added
under Tax Regime IV will decrease the after-tax appreciation shareholders receive when they
sell their stock—increasing the cost of capital and decreasing capital investment. The double
taxation view does not provide a prediction for the change since dividend imputation and capital
gains affect the cost of capital in opposite directions. Thus when comparing the behavior of
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dividend-paying firms in Tax Regime II to those in Tax Regime IV, I find support for only the
tax irrelevance and double taxation views.
IMPLICATIONS
This paper highlights a void in the current corporate dividend policy views and shows the
need for the inclusion of R&D investment. Traditionally these views have only considered
capital investment, not R&D investment. This paper demonstrates that R&D and capital
investments often move in opposite directions and that tax changes in shareholder-level dividend
taxes affect the investment in R&D. Contingent on the R&D tax incentive in place, changes in
shareholder-level dividend taxes may place pressure on firms to increase the amount of
dividends paid while decreasing the amount of R&D investment. This study found that in both
New Zealand and Australia, investment in R&D decreased after the implementation of dividend
imputation.
Decreases in investment in R&D could have a negative effect on economic growth since
research shows that domestic R&D spending is linked to the rate of innovation and the ability to
learn from others (Cameron, 1996; Salter and Martin, 2001). While on the surface, the payment
of dividends and R&D investment may seem unrelated, the results of this paper demonstrate this
is not true. Therefore when a decrease in shareholder-level dividend taxes designed to stimulate
economic growth is implemented, economic growth may be negated by a decrease in R&D
investment.
Further, when investigating the results of a tax regime simultaneously ceasing to tax
dividends at the shareholder-level and lowering corporate tax rates, I do not find support for any
of the current corporate dividend policy views (Table 2, Panel A). I find that in dividend-paying
firms, R&D investment and dividend payment change significantly. As shown in Table 3, Panel
B, all three of the corporate dividend policy views predict an increase in capital investment.
Since I do not find this, I cannot support one view over another in this setting.
However, when investigating the results of a tax regime simultaneously ceasing to tax
dividends and implementing a capital gains tax (Table 2, Panel C), I find support for the tax
irrelevance and double taxation views in dividend-paying firms. I do not find the significant
decrease in capital investment predicted by the tax capitalization view.
More research is needed before the conclusions from this paper can be generalized to
countries such as the United States. This is due primarily to the fact that unlike New Zealand and
Australia during this paper’s sample period, the United States permits share repurchases. When a
country allowing share repurchases, implements a dividend payment incentive, funding for
increased dividend payments may be drawn from funds previously used for share repurchases
instead of from R&D investment funds. Therefore, future study in countries permitting share
repurchases is needed before we can generalize the results of this paper to the United States.
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